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I. AN ANALYSIS OF CTY OF MONTEREY V. DEL MONTE DUNES AT
MONTEREY, LTD. IN THE CONTEXT OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
Tfhe number of articles, books, and lectures on regulatory takings
is legion, and this article adds itself to that formidable body of
work. Instead of beginning with an analysis of the various theories
of regulatory takings, this article will analyze the progression of one
regulatory takings case, which traveled through the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California twice, through
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals twice, and has finally been ruled
upon by the United States Supreme Court.1 In all, ajudicialjour-
1. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
698-702 (1999) (discussing procedural history of case). The Supreme Court has
presented its version of the facts of the case:
Del Monte Dunes commenced this suit against the city in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that denial of the final development
proposal was a denial of the Due Process and Equal Protection provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment and an uncompensated, and so unconsti-
tutional, regulatory taking.
The District Court dismissed the claims as unripe under Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172 . .. (1985), on the grounds that Del Monte Dunes had
neither obtained a definitive decision as to the development the city
would allow nor sought just compensation in state court. The Court of
Appeals reversed. 920 F.2d 1496 (C.A.9 1990). After reviewing at some
length the history of attempts to develop the property, the court found
that additional proposals would implicate the concerns about repetitive
and unfair procedures expressed in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo
County, 477 U.S. 340 ... (1986), and that the city's decision was suffi-
ciently final to render Del Monte Dunes' claim ripe for review. 920 F.2d
at 1501-1506. The court also noted that because the state of California
had not provided a compensatory remedy for temporary regulatory tak-
ings when the city issued its final denial, see First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church or Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 ...
(1987), Del Monte Dunes was not required to pursue relief in state court
as a precondition to federal relief. See 920 F.2d, at 1506-1507.
On remand, the District Court determined, over the city's objections, to
submit Del Monte Dunes' takings and equal protection claims to a jury
but to reserve the substantive due process claim for decision by the court.
The jury delivered a general verdict for Del Monte Dunes on its takings
claim, a separate verdict for Del Monte Dunes on its equal protection
claim, and a damages award of $1.45 million. Tr. 2 (Feb. 17, 1994). After
the jury's verdict, the District Court ruled for the city on the substantive
due process claim, stating that its ruling was not inconsistent with the
2
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ney began in 1986 when the developer first brought suit and ended
in May of 1999, when the Supreme Court held for the developer.2
The facts are compelling, and one of the attorneys before the Su-
preme Court was a persuasive soldier from the trenches of takings
jurisprudence, Michael M. Berger, who successfully argued First En-
glish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles. 3 The case is
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.4 This is a regula-
tory takings case involving, in the words of the plaintiff, a taking
"for the sake of a butterfly preserve in an area where there were no
butterflies. 5
Some hoped and feared that this case might give "an opportu-
nity for the Court to curb its expansion of takings doctrine, and to
clarify some issues of procedure and proof. If wrongly decided, Del
Monte Dunes could wreak havoc with state and local land use regula-
tion."6 In the end, however, the Supreme Court neither clarified
takings issues substantially, nor did it truly make claims more diffi-
cult to adjudicate. The opinion addressed three issues presented in
the city's petition for certiorari, 7 but the careful reader is left with
jury's verdict on the equal protection or takings claim. App. to Pet. For
Cert. A-39. The court later denied the city's motions for a new trial or for
judgment as a matter of law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 95 F.3d 1422 (C.A.9 1996). From this
judgment, the city appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Id.
2. See id. (affirming the Ninth Circuit). For a discussion of the procedural
history, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
3. 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987). First English stands for the proposition that
under the Takings Clause, where government has taken property by land use regu-
lation, the landowner may recover damages for the taking before it is finally deter-
mined that the regulation constitutes a taking of property. See id. In First English,
the plaintiff/appellant brought action against the City of Los Angeles County
under an inverse condemnation theory. See id. at 304. The cause of action arose
after the County passed an ordinance prohibiting construction in an interim flood
protection area. See id. This ordinance had the effect of denying First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church the ability to use its land as it had prior to the enact-
ment of the ordinance. See id. The California Court of Appeals held that the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment "did not require compensation as a remedy
for 'temporary' regulatory takings." Id. The Supreme Court of the United States
reversed and remanded. See id.
4. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
5. Respondent's Brief at 43, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monte-
rey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (No. 97-1235) (discussing seemingly absurd reason
for regulatory taking in this case).
6. Philip Weinberg, Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey: Will the Supreme Court
Stretch the Takings Clause Beyond the Breaking Point?, 26 B.C. ENVrL. Are. L. REv. 315,
333 (1999). The author argues that the continual limitation of the government's
ability to exercise its police powers has corrupted the original purpose of the Tak-
ings Clause. See id.
7. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 702. The three questions presented were:
2000]
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the conclusion that the Court did not deal so much with takings
issues as with section 1983 actions, raising a scholarly debate on the
right to a jury trial in section 1983 actions generally.8 This article
will address the section 1983 issues briefly, as the author's focus is
on regulatory takings and the current issues surrounding regulatory
takings claims. With this focus, City of Monterey will now be traced
through its course in the courts.
A. The Facts
The property was a 37.6 acre parcel of land on the Pacific
Ocean coast, which was used for many years as a Phillips Petroleum
Co. oil terminal and tank farm. 9 The land was mainly covered with
a non-native ice plant that was planted in order to minimize erosion
around the oil tanks. 10 Buckwheat plants, which are the only
known habitat for the endangered Smith's Blue Butterfly, were scat-
tered throughout the land as well.11 The ice was slowly covering all
the land, however, secreting a substance that forced out the
buckwheat. 2
This land, best described as an abandoned industrial site, was
zoned for multi-family residential use with up to twenty-nine units
per acre - more than 1,000 homes for the entire parcel.13 Ponder-
osa Homes, the predecessor to Del Monte Dunes, owned the land
(1) whether issues of liability were properly submitted to the jury on Del
Monte Dunes' regulatory takings claim,
(2) whether the Court of Appeals impermissibly based its decision on a
standard that allowed the jury to reweigh the reasonableness of the city's
land-use decision, and
(3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in assuming that the rough-pro-
portionality standard of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), ap-
plied to this case.
Id.
8. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin best described City of Monterey as "a
§ 1983 case [where] most of the discussion in the U.S. Supreme Court opinion
involves the right to jury trial." Eberle v. Dane County Bd. of Adjustment, 595
N.W. 2d 730, 748 (Wisc. 1999).
See also John de Angeli, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling on Takings: Issue Allowed to go
Before aJury, 221 N.Y.L.J. 3, 3 (1999) (stating "[u]nlike the Court's other takings
rulings in the last 20 years, City of Monterey breaks little or no new ground in its
analysis of what constitutes a taking").
9. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 694-95 (discussing use of land prior to
taking).
10. See id.
11. See id. (discussing that land carried plants that are only known habitat for
Smith's Blue Butterfly).
12. See id. (explaining impact of ice plant on buckwheat plants).
13. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 694-95 (discussing use of land prior to
regulatory taking).
4
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and submitted an application to the City of Monterey ("City") for a
344-home development.' 4 This request was rejected by the City
with the indication that a plan with only seven units per acre, or 264
units, "would be received favorably." 15 A subsequent plan for the
264 units was submitted, and the City Planning Commission turned
down the application, stating that a 224-unit proposal "would be
received favorably."' 6 Another plan, for 224-homes, was denied,
with directions to consider submitting a 190-unit development. 17
Another plan was submitted, worked over, and finally, the City
Council approved a 190-unit proposal. The 37.6 acres were, how-
ever, divided up into buildings and patios on only 5.1 acres, an-
other 6.7 acres consisted of public and private streets, 17.9 acres in
public open space, and the final 7.9 acres in landscaped acres.' 8 As
this final application was pending, Del Monte Dunes purchased the
property and pursued the application.' 9 The site plan was ap-
proved contingent upon the completion of fifteen conditions, and
when these conditions were substantially met, "the planning com-
mission acted against its professional staff's recommendation and
denied the tentative map for the 190 units."20 On June 17, 1986,
the City Council formally found that the design was "likely to cause
substantial environmental damage and substantially injure the
habitat of the endangered Smith's Blue Butterfly;" the City accord-
ingly denied the map.2' At this point, the plaintiff brought action
against the City with eight claims for relief, including: five substan-
tive claims based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 22
14. See id. (noting that Paradise Homes sought to develop land at issue).
15. See Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496,
1502 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter "Del Monte I"].
16. See id. (discussing City Planning Commission's regulations with respect to
land use).
17. See id. (noting that City Planning Commission again rejected plan and
implied that more favorable plan would be better received).
18. See Respondent's Brief at 4, City of Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (No. 97-
1235) (asserting that final agreement was full of exactions, contrary to claims of
City of Monterey).
19. See Del Monte I, 920 F.3d at 1499 (elaborating on Del Monte Dunes' acqui-
sition of property).
20. Id. (pointing out that City's architectural review committee approved
plan).
21. See id. at 1503 (highlighting that council found proposed plan was con-
ceptually satisfactory and in conformance with previous decisions of council re-
garding density and number of units).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. v. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution states: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2000]
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as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment; 23 the Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; the
common law principles of estoppel and unjust enrichment; and
three remaining claims identifying remedies for an injunction
against the City, relief under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United
States Code, 24 and declaratory relief under Tide 28, sections 2201
and 2202.25
B. The Case History
Before discussing the subsequent case history, it is interesting
to note that no Smith's Blue Butterfly has ever been seen on the
property.26 Although the City contended that the project would
threaten the habitat with total destruction, the project contained
plans to plant and preserve a buckwheat area, and "ironically, with-
out Del Monte's project (that would remove all ice plant and sow
23. See U.S. CONsT. art. XIV, § 1. Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment
states, in part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
24. See U.S. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
provides:
Civil action for deprivation of rights.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the pur-
poses of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a state of the District of
Columbia.
Id..
25. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1994); see also Del Monte I, 921 F.2d at 150 (dis-
cussing claims for relief).
26. See Respondent's Brief at 3, City of Monterey (no. 97-1235) states:
Although buckwheat is the natural habitat of the SBB, no eggs, larvae, or
adults of the species were found during extensive searches of this prop-
erty in 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984; one SBB larva was found late in 1984;
none in 1985. The SBB lives for only one week, travels 200 feet (maxi-
mum) and must land on a mature, flowering buckwheat plant in order to
survive. The site is quite isolated from other possible SBB habitats, so
that travel to or from this property is unlikely, if not impossible (internal
citations omitted).
6
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additional buckwheat) the putative SBB habitat would have been
overrun and eliminated by ice plant."27 Upon hearing these facts,
Justice Antonin Scalia is reported as saying, "[e]ven though there's
a reasonable explanation for the fifth denial, or the third denial, or
the second denial, after a while, you begin to smell a rat."28 During
litigation, the property, considered unusable following the numer-
ous application denials, was sold to the state of California for a pub-
lic park for $800,000 more than the landowner had paid for the
property. 29
At trial, the constitutional claims were dismissed as not ripe for
review, and the other claims were dismissed as well.3 0 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit held that the constitutional challenges were ripe
for review and remanded the case to the trial court.31 Upon re-
mand, the district court held that the "City's actions denied Del
Monte equal protection and resulted in an unconstitutional tak-
ing," and the jury awarded $1,450,000 for the temporary taking.3 2
The district court also held that the City did not violate Del Monte's
substantive due process rights because valid regulatory reasons for
denying the development application were asserted. 33 The City ap-
pealed the district court's denial of its motion for a new trial with
respect to the equal protection and inverse condemnation claims.3 4
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the inverse condemna-
tion claim could properly be presented to a jury, the evidence sup-
ported the takings finding, and the award was not excessive. 35 The
27. Id. (internal citations omitted) (arguing that developer's plan would actu-
ally aid environment that had previously been used as pseudo trash dump by
citizens).
28. Mark Helm, Buttefly at Center of High Court Battle, MILWAUKEE J. & SENI-
NEL 9, Oct. 18, 1998, at 9 (reporting on oral argument proceedings before Su-
preme Court).
29. See Petitioner's Brief at 3, Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monte-
rey, 95 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-1284) (discussing compensation Del
Monte Dunes received for property).
30. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
698-99 (1999) (discussing dismissal of certain claims). For further discussion of
procedural history, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
31. See Del Monte I, 920 F.2d at 1509 (discussing Ninth Circuit's holding).
32. See Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422,
1425 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter "Del Monte II"] (explaining district court found
that City had valid regulatory reasons for denying Del Monte's development plans
and, therefore, City did not violate Del Monte's substantive due process rights).
33. See Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1425 (discussing district court's holding with
respect to Del Monte's substantive due process rights).
34. See id. (discussing City's appeal from district court's denial of motion for
new trial with respect to equal protection and condemnation claims).
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City once more appealed, this time to the Supreme Court, and cer-
tiorari was granted.36 The case appeared to set itself up for creating
no new or different regulatory takings standard, but instead it ap-
peared that the holding would turn on the procedural issues of a
jury trial in an inverse condemnation proceeding.37 The issues sug-
gested by both Petitioner and Respondent were procedural in na-
ture.38 As expected, the Supreme Court ruling did address takings
issues when it affirmed the Ninth Circuit, but the core of the opin-
ion dealt with section 1983 actions. 39
36. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 523 U.S. 1045
(1998) (granting certiori).
37. For a discussion of issues on appeal to the Supreme Court at the time the
Court granted certiorari, see infra note 140 and accompanying text.
38. In the brief submitted to the Supreme Court, the Petitioner presented
three questions:
1. Whether, in a regulatory takings action challenging a local land
use decision, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that all inverse condemnation lia-
bility issues be determined by the court rather than by a jury.
2. Whether liability for a regulatory taking can be based upon a stan-
dard that allows a jury or court to reweigh evidence concerning the rea-
sonableness of the public entity's land use decision.
3. Whether the rough proportionality standard established by this
Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), in the context of
property exactions was properly applied by the Ninth Circuit to an in-
verse condemnation claim based upon a regulatory denial.
Petitioner's Brief at *i, City of Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (No. 97-1235).
The Respondent also presented three questions:
1. (a) When a citizen sues a local government agency for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for a violation of federally protected rights, may a
jury decide whether the government is liable, whatever the substantive
constitutional or statutory rights invaded? (b) May a municipal defen-
dant in a § 1983 action for damages forbid a trial by jury?
2. In light of this Court's decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commn., 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987), Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 391, fn. 8 (1994), each of which concluded that purported
"findings" made by state and local government agencies to support land
use regulatory actions must be subjected to searching review to determine
the validity of their bases, is it proper for the trier of fact in a regulatory
taking case to review the reasonableness of such governmental action?
3. When local government regulates the use of land, must the extent
of the regulatory restrictions imposed on the property be in proportion
to the harm sought to be prevented?
Respondent's Brief at *i, City of Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (No. 97-1235).
39. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 721-22 (discussing Supreme Court's hold-
ing that touches upon takings issues, but focuses upon section 1983 actions).
8
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C. Analysis of Holdings
1. Del Monte I
a. Ripeness of Constitutional Claims
Now that the considerable number of facts have been
presented, it is helpful to analyze the Ninth Circuit's holdings in
both Del Monte I and I. In Del Monte I, the ripeness of the constitu-
tional claims was contested, but the Ninth Circuit found the issue to
be ripe.40 The constitutional claims challenged the application of
the City's land-use regulations with an "as- applied challenge"
where the landowner must show that: (1) the government has taken
the property by imposing regulations that go too far; and (2) the
government has done so without tendering just compensation. 4 1
Both elements, the taking and the compensation, must be ripe for
the claim to be justiciable. 42
(i) Ripeness of the Taking Element
With respect to the ripeness of the taking element, the as-ap-
plied claim is not ripe until the local government has issued a final
decision on the application for the affected property. 43 There are
two components to the finality requirement: (1) there must be a
rejection of development formally sought by the landowner; 44 and
(2) "the local government [must] determine authoritatively the
type and intensity of development that land-use regulations will al-
low on the subject property" because this aids the court in evaluat-
ing whether the regulation is excessive.45 The Ninth Circuit
40. See id. at 1633 (dismissing Ninth Circuit's holding that constitutional
claims were ripe).
41. See Del Monte I, 920 F.2d at 1500; see also Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818
F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1986), modified on other grounds, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir.
1987) (setting forth requirements necessary to bring constitutional Takings Clause
challenge).
42. See Del Monte 1, 920 F.2d at 1500; see also Austin v. City & County of Hono-
lulu, 840 F.2d 678, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing ripeness requirements).
43. See Del Monte I, 920 F.2d at 1500.
44. See id. (discussing finality requirements; see also Williamson County Reg'l
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (noting that courts re-
quire two criteria be met before they will determine that final decision has been
entered).
45. See Del Monte I, 920 F.2d at 1501 (citing Herrington v. County of Sonoma,
857 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1988); Lai v. City & County of Honolulu, 841 F.2d 301,
303 (9th Cir. 1988)) (discussing finality requirements courts consider when ruling
upon ripeness in takings cases).
2000]
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recognizes a limited futility exception where resubmission of a plan
or application may be excused if it would be futile.46
Four different possible standards can show futility and allow an
exception to the finality requirement. First, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the finality requirement does not force the land-
owner to "pursue a development application through piecemeal lit-
igation or unfair procedures." 47 Second, futility can be shown if the
plaintiff can establish that further applications "would cause such
excessive delay that the property would lose its beneficial use."48
Third, the Supreme Court has found a submission and rejection of
two plans sufficient to ripen a takings claim.49 Fourth, the Ninth
Circuit "excused as futile a landowner's failure to apply for a vari-
ance that the local government was powerless to grant."50 If the
case meets any of these four example of futility, then the finality
requirement can be excused. 51
In Del Monte I, the City contended that "appellant's claim is not
ripe until they submit enough proposals to enable the City to
pinpoint all the features of an acceptable development project on
the Dunes." 52 This argument borders on the absurd. The hoops
that Del Monte Dunes jumped through after the City denied the
original 1981 application are best described as a "five-year odyssey
through the administrative process, during which the City turned
down five different plans for the property."53 This five-year odyssey,
when analyzed under the four futility exceptions, shows that further
applications and amendments would have been futile (Penn Central
46. See Del Monte 1, 920 F.2d at 1501 (presenting futility exception); see also
Herrington, 857 F.2d at 570 (noting that courts recognize futility exception); Shel-
ter Creek Dev. Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d 375, 379 (9th Cir. 1988) (provid-
ing futility exception to finality requirement).
47. Del Monte I, 920 F.2d at 1501 (citing Macdonald, Somer & Frates v. County
of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 350 n.7 (1986)) (discussing finality requirement).
48. Id. (citing Kinzli, 818 F.2d at 1454) (discussing Norco Construction, Inc. v.
King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986)).
49. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 116 & n.17
(1978).
50. Del Monte I, 920 F.2d at 1501 (citing Herrington, 857 F.2d at 570 & n.2)
(noting that this is most recent standard set forth by Supreme Court).
51. See id. at 1501 (discussing four instances in which courts have excused
finality requirement).
52. Id. at 1502 (reporting that City claimed that only when enough proposals
were submitted could courts determine whether regulations had extended to
taking).
53. Michael M. Berger, Land-Use Rights Are No Right-Wing Myth, 21 NAT'L L.J.
27, 27 (1998) (discussing hardships Del Monte encountered when seeking ap-
proval of its plan).
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Transportation Co. v. City of New York), 54 time-consuming (Kinzli v.
City of Santa Cruz and Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County),5 5 un-
fair and piece-meal (MacDonald, Somer & Frates v. County of Yolo), 56
and unnecessary. 5 7 The court properly concluded that "further re-
application is not required and that the taking component of appel-
lant's claim is sufficiently ripe for review." 58 Thus, the ripeness
requirement was satisfied as to the regulatory taking claim.
(ii) Ripeness of the Compensation Element
Having decided that the taking component was ripe for review,
the Ninth Circuit turned to an analysis of the ripeness of the com-
pensation element, analyzing whether the plaintiff had actually re-
quested and been denied just compensation after the taking.5 9 The
importance of the compensation element stands out in the follow-
ing statement by the Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
v. Hamilton Bank Court: "[t]he Fifth Amendment does not pro-
scribe the [mere] taking of property; it proscribes taking without
just compensation. " 60 This quote helps clarify the entire takings
concept, where the act of taking alone is not the violation of the
Fifth Amendment, but the act coupled without compensation con-
stitutes a takings violation. 61 Following this reasoning, takings
claims are not ripe for review until the government refuses to give
compensation for the taking.62 Using this analysis, the district court
concluded that the plaintiff "had shown nothing more than the un-
certainty of California compensation procedures for regulatory tak-
54. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 116 n.17, 136-38 n.34-36 (explaining that rejec-
tion of two plans is sufficient to establish futility).
55. See Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing
Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986))
(holding that futility could be established by showing that additional pursuit of
permission development would cause undue delay).
56. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 350 n.7
(1986) (noting that finality requirement does not require landowner to pursue
development application through unfair procedures or piecemeal litigation).
57. See Del Monte I, 920 F.2d at 1501 (discussing futility exceptions).
58. Id. (distinguishing this decision from another timely decision where
Ninth Circuit found claims to be unripe for review).
59. See id. (discussing ripeness of compensation element).
60. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 194 (noting Fifth Amendment's protection against taking of property without
just compensation).
61. See id. (noting that no constitutional violation has occurred until land-
owner has been denied compensation after taking has occurred).
62. See MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 350 (indicating ripeness of takings claims).
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ings."63 However, upon review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the district court had evaluated the compensation procedures at
the wrong point in time, and the proper time frame would have
been the time at which the actual taking had occurred - when the
City rejected the plaintiff's last development application. 64
The court explained the need for analyzing the case at the
time of the taking by noting that although First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles could be applicable to the
case at hand, where it expressly held that the Fifth Amendment re-
quires compensation for regulatory takings,65 First English came af-
ter the plaintiff filed this action. 66 The requirement that the
appropriate time period comes at the time of the taking was already
well established in two Ninth Circuit decisions.67 The court also
cited Williamson County, which stated, "all that is required is that a
reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compen-
sation exist at the time of the taking."68 Since California law, at the
time of the taking, did not provide for landowners to seek any com-
pensation through an inverse condemnation action, the sole rem-
edy was mandamus or injunctive relief.69 Because there were no
compensation procedures, the "compensation procedures" were
woefully inadequate, and the landowners had established the ripe-
ness of their compensation element; the claims were ripe for
review. 70
63. Del Monte I, 921 F.2d at 1507 (discussing district court's holding that plain-
tiffs claim was not ripe).
64. See id.
65. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 317-22 (1987) (discussing need for compensation in regulatory
takings).
66. See Del Monte I, 921 F.2d at 1507 (noting that after appellants filed this
action, Supreme Court expressly held that Fifth Amendment requires states to
compensate regulatory takings).
67. See Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1989)
(noting appropriate time period for consideration of compensation in takings
cases); Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1402 (9th
Cir. 1989) (pointing out that appropriate time for determining whether compensa-
tion was adequate is at time of taking).
68. Del Monte I, 921 F.2d at 1507 (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194)
(supporting assertion that appropriate period for measuring adequacy of state's
compensation procedures is at time of taking).
69. See id. (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 29-31 (Cal. 1979), affd
on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), abrogated by First English, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)).
70. See id. (discussing ripeness of both takings and compensation elements).
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b. Due Process and Equal Protection Claims
When analyzing due process and equal protection claims for
ripeness, the court applies the same final decision requirement as
above in the regulatory takings claims. 71 The due process claim can
only be established where it is shown that the City's decision was
arbitrary and irrational.72 Since this issue had originally been dis-
missed in a summary judgment motion, the Ninth Circuit reversed
and sent it back to the trial court.78
The landowners' equal protection claim was based on the fact
that other properties surrounding the Dunes project had been de-
veloped into residential units without going through the painful ap-
plication/denial process as in the case at hand.74 Unfortunately for
the landowners, in an equal protection challenge, "such municipal
decisions are presumptively constitutional and, therefore, need
only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest, unless the
distinctive treatment of the party involves either a fundamental
ight or a suspect classification." 75 The landowners were able to
demonstrate that this type of claim was recognized by Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission. Accordingly, this claim was sent back to
the trial court for further discussion, effectively reversing the trial
court's summary judgment dismissal. 76 Now the trial court had a
number of claims to adjudicate.
The case raises some interesting factors after only analyzing the
first review by the Ninth Circuit. First, the ripeness issue seems to
be the single most important issue that allows the landowner her
day in court.7 7 If the landowner cannot prove ripeness of the tak-
ings or compensation element, if the government actor can show
that the administrative process has not been exhausted, if the com-
71. See id. (citing Hoehne, 879 F.2d at 532; Shelter Creek Dev. Corp. v. City of
Oxnard, 838 F.2d 375, 379 (9th Cir. 1988); Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d
1449, 1455-56 (9th Cir. 1987); and Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 801
F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986)) (discussing final decision requirement in ripeness
questions).
72. See id. at 1508 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1
(1976); Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 1988); Barancik v. County
of Marin, 872 F.2d 834, 836 (9th Cir. 1988)) (noting requirements for establishing
due process claims).
73. See Del Monte I, 921 F.2d at 1509 (explaining remand of due process and
equal protection claims).
74. See id. at 1508 (discussing rationale behind equal protection claim).
75. Id. (citing City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Boone
v. Redevelopment Agency, 841 F.2d 886, 892 (9th Cir. 1988)).
76. See id. at 1509 (i.structing remand of equal protection to trial court for
further discussion).
77. See id. at 1500 (discussing importance of ripeness).
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pensation has not been requested, or that further non-trial action
would not be futile, then the landowner cannot even obtain the
court's aid, in the form of mandamus, injunction, or damages. 7
Next, the due process and equal protection claims are heavily
weighted in the government's favor, but, in this case, not weighted
heavily enough to overcome the jury's decision in Del Monte I1 79
But it is best to wait on further discussion of this until the second
appellate decision is discussed, where the jury found for the
landowners.
2. Del Monte II
Upon remand, the district court ordered the reinstated issues
tried to the jury, with the exception of the substantive due process
claims, which the court determined contained only legal issues.80
The jury awarded Del Monte $1,450,000 because it found that the
City's actions denied Del Monte equal protection and caused an
unconstitutional taking.81 The court, however, found that since the
City asserted valid regulatory reasons for denying the permits, there
was no substantive due process violation. 82 Although both parties
appealed, Del Monte's appeal was waived at oral argument, pend-
ing an affirmation of the district court's judgment.83 The City, on
the other hand, appealed everything, contending that the court,
not the jury should have decided equal protection and takings
claims, that the City was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,
and even that a new trial for damages was necessary because of the
erroneous admittance of evidence. 84 What follows is an analysis of
the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the City's claims, demonstrating
that although the City, and any inverse condemnor, fears jury in-
78. See Del Monte I, 921 F.2d at 1500-08 (discussing ripeness of plaintiff's
claims). For further discussion of ripeness requirements for the takings and com-
pensation element, see supra notes 43-70 and accompanying text.
79. For a discussion of the decision in Del Monte II, see infra notes 86-135 and
accompanying text.
80. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 699-700 (noting that district court rein-
stated issues).
81. See id. (discussing jury verdict).
82. See id. (discussing that its ruling for City with respect to substantive due
process claim was not inconsistent with jury's verdict on other constitutional
claims).
83. See Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1425 (detailing issues appealed by both parties
after decision entered by district court).
84. See id. at 1425-26 (outlining issues on appeal).
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volvement, there is a good argument for a jury trial in inverse con-
demnation/takings/equal protection claims. 85
a. The Right to a Jury Trial for Inverse Condemnation
Claims
First, the court addressed the jury question with the issue
"whether Del Monte was entitled to a jury trial pursuant to section
1983 before we consider whether the Seventh Amendment guaran-
tees a jury trial under the present circumstances. 86 Since section
1983 permits persons deprived of rights to bring "an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,"8 7 but since
the statute is silent as to whether these actions demand a right to
jury trial, the court analyzed "whether Congress intended this stat-
ute to create a right to trial byjury."8 8 "Action at law" has tradition-
ally permitted a jury trial, so the court next asked whether the
inverse condemnation claim could be compared to a suit at com-
mon law.89
Here was the major dispute between the City and Del Monte,
both before the Ninth Circuit and in their briefs before the Su-
preme Court. The City argued that inverse condemnation actions
are analogous to eminent domain actions. 90 The landowners ar-
gued that inverse condemnation actions are similar to all other
1983 actions. 91 The court decided that since Del Monte sought
compensatory or "legal" damages, this was an action at law.92 This
was a predictably large and complex area which the Supreme Court
later addressed, and it provides the material for many enterprising
85. For a discussion of advantages of jury trial in inverse condemnation, tak-
ings and equal protection claims, see infra notes 86-106 and accompanying text.
86. Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1426 (referencing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
577 (1978)) (stating courts should avoid Seventh Amendment question if statute
provides right to jury trial).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
88. Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1427 (citing Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580) (providing
for rights of parties to bring actions under section 1983).
89. See id. (citing Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 1993)) (stat-
ing where jury right is not solely limited to actions that existed at common law,
right extends to actions that are analogous thereto).
90. See Petitioner's Brief, at 7-8, Del Monte II, (No. 97-1235) (arguing that emi-
nent domain actions are similar to inverse condemnation proceedings).
91. See id. (stating "[aill § 1983 plaintiffs are entitled to be treated alike, as all
are invoking the same statutory remedial scheme against local government entities
and officials who violate federal constitutional or statutory guarantees, regardless
of the nature of the violation").
92. See Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1427 (inquiring as to nature of claim and rem-
edy sought and finding that, because legal rights were asserted and legal relief is
available, Del Monte's action is "action at law").
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scholars. This article will defer to latter scholars and leave the in-
verse condemnation-jury trial issue for another day.
Next, the court addressed the City's argument that a jury
should not determine issues of liability in an inverse condemnation
claim. 93 Generally, to prevail on an inverse condemnation claim,
Del Monte must show that the City's actions "(1) did not substan-
tially advance a legitimate public purpose; or (2) denied it econom-
ically viable use of its property."94 The court also observed that
throughout modern Supreme Court takings jurisprudence, the in-
verse condemnation claim is an "essentially ad hoc, factual in-
quiry."95 With this backdrop, the court asked if the existence of an
economically viable use was essentially factual, and answered the
question in the affirmative. 96 If the existence of an economically
viable use was factual, or even a mixed question of law and fact,
then it was a proper question to submit to the jury.97 This was a
sticking point for the City, and for any future condemnor, because
juries may tend to find in favor of the burdened landowner,
whereas a judge could view the question more dispassionately.9"
93. See id. at 1428 (arguing that issues of liability are questions of law and
should not be decided by jury, regardless of whether statute provides right to jury
trial).
94. Id. (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834
(1987)) (recognizing that land-use regulation is not taking if it "substantially ad-
vance[s] legitimate state interests" and does not "den[y] an owner economically
viable use of his land"). The court held that the government has power to condi-
tion land use upon concession by an owner, so long as the condition furthers the
same governmental purpose advanced as justification for prohibiting the use. See
id.
95. See id. (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1015 (1992)) (stating that Court prefers case-by-case determination rather than
fixed formula); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 473-74 (1.987) (finding that determination depends upon facts of each case);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (relating
Court's inability to develop an exact method to determine when public action re-
quires compensation and resort to individual resolution); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (stating that question of compensation "depends
on the particular facts").
96. See Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1427 (referencing Williamson County Reg'l
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 182-83 (1985)) (recognizing
jury finding of no economically viable use); see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503
U.S. 519, 523 (1992) (holding economically viable use inquiry "necessarily entails
complex factual assessments"); Sadowsky v. City of NewYork, 732 F.2d 312, 317 (2d
Cir. 1984) (finding whether taking has occurred is essentially factual inquiry).
97. SeeDelMontell, 95 F.3d at 1429 (declaring that district court did not err by
letting jury decide question, even though inquiry was mixed question of fact and
law).
98. For a further discussion of the application of judicial scrutiny, see infra
notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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After determining that the economically viable use question
was proper for a jury, the court turned to the second theory of lia-
bility - whether the denial of the permits substantially advanced a
legitimate public purpose.99 Although the City argued that this
"substantially advanced a legitimate public purpose" test is analo-
gous to substantive due process claims, which, it argued, must be
decided by a court, the court simply stated that "our precedent does
not provide a clear answer as to whether substantive due process
claims are jury questions."100 The court instead analyzed the jury
instructions to view which standard they presented to the jury.10 1
The instruction itself stated:
Public bodies, such as the city, have the authority to take
actions which substantially advance legitimate public inter-
est and legitimate public interest can include protecting
the environment, preserving open space agriculture, pro-
tecting the health and safety of its citizens, and regulating
the quality of the community by looking at development.
So one of your jobs as jurors is to decide if the city's deci-
sion here substantially advanced any such legitimate pub-
lic purpose. The regulatory actions of the city or any
agency substantially advances a legitimate public purpose
if the action bears a reasonable relationship to that
objective.
Now, if the preponderance of the evidence estab-
lishes that there was no reasonable relationship between
the city's denial of the claims proposal and legitimate pub-
lic purpose, you should find in favor of the plaintiff. If
you find that there existed a reasonable relationship be-
tween the city's decision and a legitimate public purpose,
you should find in favor of the city. As long as the regula-
tory action by the city substantially advances their legiti-
99. See Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1429 (analyzing second prong of test to deter-
mine inverse condemnation, deciding if question of whether actions advanced
public purpose is properly decided by jury).
100. Id. The court compared Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1302-03 (9th
Cir. 1988) (reviewing de novo issue whether government actions were "arbitrary or
capricious" for purposes of establishing substantive due process claim in takings
context), with Hoeck v. City of Portland, 57 F.3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 1995) (conclud-
ing that no reasonable jury could have found that government violated plaintiff s
substantive due process rights in takings context). Without clear precedent, the
court preferred to look at eminent domain and inverse condemnation cases. See
Del Monte I, 95 F.3d at 1429.
101. See Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1429 (reasoning that uncontested framing of
jury instruction was place to begin analysis of whether issue is factual).
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mate public purpose, and its underlying motives and
reasons are not to be inquired into. Now, in analyzing
whether plaintiff's right to compensation has been vio-
lated, that is the property was taken, you are entitled to
consider the [extent] to which the city, in its regulation,
interfered with the plaintiffs reasonable distinct invest-
ment back[ed] expectations. So those are your instruc-
tions of the law with respect to the taking... claim. 102
Looking at this instruction, it seemed well-drawn, simple, and suffi-
cient to allow the jury to determine an issue of liability. The jurors,
after having listened carefully, were left with the simple reasonable-
ness question: was the denial reasonably related to a legitimate pub-
lic purpose? 10 3
The district judge did point out that "whether the issue of ad-
vancement of a legitimate public purpose is one for the jury or
court is close,' 0 4 but the Ninth Circuit observed that this was a rea-
sonableness inquiry, and "whether the government's actions are
'reasonable' is often a jury issue." 10 5 The reasonableness issue was
very fact-bound in this case, and the court concluded that this was a
type of issue that could be put before the jury.10 6
b. No Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict - The Rough
Proportionality Test
Finally, the court weighed the evidence in the case and re-
jected the City's motion for ajudgment notwithstanding the verdict
102. Id. at 1429 (instructing jury to find action advanced legitimate state in-
terest if it found reasonable relationship between denial of permit and legitimate
public purpose).
103. See id. (defining legitimate public purposes as "protecting... environ-
ment, preserving open space agriculture, protecting the health and safety of its
citizens, and regulating the quality of the community by looking at development"
and charging jury with determining whether reasonable relationship existed be-
tween city's action and any enumerated purpose).
104. Id. at 1430 (pointing out that most courts that have visited this issue de-
termine that "reasonable" inquires go to juries).
105. Id. (citing Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (examining
whether release of police dog on individual was reasonable under Fourth Amend-
ment is jury question); Hemphill v. Kincheloe, 987 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1993)
(stating whether prisoner searches are reasonably related to penological goal is
jury question); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 654 n.4 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding
whether city's action is rationally related to public purpose is question of fact)).
106. For a complete discussion of this topic, see City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at
722-24.
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regarding the inverse condemnation claim.107 Here was a straight-
forward takings analysis (with the evidence construed in the light
most favorable to Del Monte). 108 The court began its analysis by
laying out the framework from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Com-
mission, "the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation
does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land."109 And even if the City
had a legitimate interest, that interest must be "roughly propor-
tional" to furthering its interest. 110 The court then laid out six
points where the City failed these background standards.1 First,
the City failed where evidence showed that the environmental im-
pact of grading was not significant or was mitigated.11 2 Second, evi-
dence showed that the City had already approved Del Monte's
environmental plan. 13 Third, there was evidence that the City had
required, in an earlier plan, that access be made through an adjoin-
ing property owner's land. 114 Fourth, a staff report to the City Plan-
ning Commission showed that the restoration plan satisfied the
environmental conditions previously imposed in 1984.115 Fifth, the
107. See Del Monte IL 95 F.3d at 1432 (finding sufficient evidence to prove Del
Monte's claim and holding that rational juror could conclude that City's action
was not substantially related to legitimate public purpose).
108. See id. at 1430 (reviewing de novo district court's denial ofjudgment not-
withstanding verdict and taking on role of district court).
109. Id. (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016
(1992)) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted) (reiterating that regulations
"that compel the property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his property" and
regulations denying "all economically beneficial or productive use of land" are the
two categories of regulatory action "compensable without case-specific inquiry into
the public interest advanced in support of the restraint").
110. See id. (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)) (finding term
"reasonable relationship" confusing and preferring term "rough proportionality,"
Court said that "[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city
must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication
is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development").
111. See id. at 1430-31 (deciding Del Monte's evidence sufficient to rebut each
of City's reasons for denying permit and finding incomplete nexus between City's
actions and interests).
112. See Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1431 (denying City's claim that proposed de-
velopment would create disruptions and have "significant environmental
impacts").
113. See id. (agreeing that Del Monte's evidence of city approval and Del
Monte's assurances of unlikely environmental damage discredited City's testimony
that plan would negatively impact flora and fauna).
114. See id. (finding permit denial due to inadequate access improper be-
cause construction of access road by Del Monte required city action to condemn
other properties not owned by Del Monte).
115. See id. The City claimed that the development would cause substantial
injury to the habitat of the endangered Smith's Blue Butterfly, but Del Monte's
environmental expert disproved the assertion, confirming the findings of the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service. See id.
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City had previously approved a larger plan but suddenly found
more environmental impact with a smaller development.11 6 Sixth,
the City only summarily stated that the project would have a "signifi-
cant impact on the environment, and no demonstration of overrid-
ing considerations has been made which would support approval of
this project."117 With these six factors, the court held that Del
Monte had presented sufficient evidence to rebut the City's reasons
for denial of the permit, and the jury could have found that the
denial of Del Monte's application lacked a sufficient nexus with the
City's objectives.11
c. No Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict - The
Economically Viable Use Test
The City also lost the other takings argument, because "[t]he
jury also could have found the City liable because it denied Del
Monte all economically viable use of its property."119 Interestingly,
"the term 'economically viable use' has yet to be defined with much
precision."' 20 However, the existence of permissible uses helps in
the determination of whether a development restriction has denied
an owner of economically viable use, and the Supreme Court has
justified this rule in Lucas, saying that "total deprivation of benefi-
cial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a
physical appropriation." 121 This clarifies the rule that compensa-
tion is required when regulations "leave the owner of land without
economically beneficial or productive options for its use - typically
.. . by requiring land to be left substantially in its natural state -
[which suggests] that private property is being pressed into some
116. See id. (declaring City's denial unsubstantiated due to prior approval of
plan identical to current proposal except that previous layout was even larger de-
velopment; nothing but size of development changed between time of approval
and denial).
117. Id. (finding generalized claim of environmental damage unsubstantiated
and duplicative of previous reasons for disapproval based on destruction of butter-
fly's habitat and injury to flora and fauna).
118. See Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1431-32 (denying City's argument that no
rational juror could have concluded that City's denial "lacked sufficient nexus with
its stated objectives").
119. Id. at 1432 (finding that no inquiry into state's interests necessary where
taking via denial of economic use is absolute).
120. See Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 616 (9th Cir.
1993) (recognizing Supreme Court has suggested owners only need to be partially
deprived of economically viable uses).
121. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992)
(noting that Court has never set forth justification for rule that denial of economi-
cally beneficial use of land equals physical taking).
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form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm."122
The City argued that this test defeated the takings claim be-
cause Del Monte sold the property to the State of California for
$800,000 more than it had paid.1 23 However, the court noted that
"a government buy-out ... would likely implicate the issue of just
compensation." 124 Instead of showing that the property was not
taken, the government buy-out could show government coercion
and a virtual condemnation that did not pay just compensation.
This action would constitute a taking. 125
The fact that there was a buyer for the property was not helpful
for the City's arguments, perhaps in light of the Second Circuit's
adopted test which looks to "whether the property use allowed by
the regulation is sufficiently desirable to permit property owners to
sell the property to someone for that use."1 26 Here, the Ninth Cir-
cuit adopted a different test: "[where] government action relegates
permissible uses of property to those consistent with leaving the
property in its natural state (e.g., nature preserve or public space),
and no competitive market exists for the property without the possi-
bility of development, a taking may have occurred." 127
In applying this new test, the court found that the City had
denied the ability to build on the western third of Del Monte's
property, the City's viewshed restrictions denied the ability to build
on the rest of the property, and although Del Monte had complied
with the fifteen conditions imposed by the City in the 1984 resolu-
tion, the City still rejected the application, leading Del Monte to
conclude that the property was no longer commercially marketa-
122. Id. at 1018 (affirmatively supporting compensation requirement for dep-
rivation of economic use and discussing "benefits flowing to the public from pres-
ervation of open space").
123. See Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1432 (arguing that economically viable uses
must have existed if property could be sold for profit).
124. Id. (finding that landowner who thinks government bought out his prop-
erty at unfairly low price might bring action for just compensation and receiving
some payment for land would not prove as matter of law that economically viable
use exists).
125. See id. (finding that government buy-out program would not necessarily
.shield government from Takings Clause").
126. Id. at 1433 (citing Park Ave. Tower Assoc. v. City of New York, 746 F.2d
135, 139 (2d Cir. 1984)) (internal quotations omitted) (stating that existence of
one buyer, particularly government buyer, does not defeat takings claim as matter
of law).
127. Id. (modifying Second Circuit's test to emphasize that government regu-
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ble.128 With this test, the City failed its challenge to the takings
holding.129 The court also reminded the City that the jury was not
compelled to find that there was an economically viable use of the
property, especially in light of the fact that "[a]s the land was zoned
for multi-unit residential use, once the jury determined that it was
unusable for that purpose, it was entitled to conclude that the City's
actions had effected a taking." °30 There was substantial evidence to
support the jury's finding, and the City was not able to overcome
that evidence on appeal.13 1
d. The Damages Award
The City also moved for a new trial on the basis that the jury
awarded Del Monte excessive damages.1 32 The court "must uphold
the jury's finding unless the amount is grossly excessive... clearly
not supported by the evidence, or based only on speculation or
guesswork.' 13 3 This was a high hurdle for the City to overcome on
appeal. The City challenged the jury's consideration of delay dam-
ages up to the date of trial, the expert opinions on the value of the
property, and the assumption that there was a reasonable possibility
that the California Coastal Commission would have approved the
proposed development.134 The court held that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to make that determination, and the City lost
on this point as well. 135 Damages, or property valuation, are a com-
mon area of discontent in condemnation awards and in takings ac-
128. See Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1433-34 (finding that City's requirements of
public beach use and access, "view corridors" and preservation of flora and fauna
denied Del Monte's beneficial use of their property and rightfully produced con-
clusion that land was not marketable).
129. See id. at 1434 (analyzing City's requirements under new test and finding
that City sufficiently deprived Del Monte of economic use, equivalent to taking).
130. See id. (finding that City requirements "made it impossible to design any
plan for residential development" of property and that "jury could conclude that
additional development applications would have been futile").
131. See id. (confirming holding of Del Monte I, that Del Monte's evidence
refuted City's arguments and jury could find that City's actions deprived Del
Monte of beneficial use of land, effecting taking).
132. See id. at 1434-35 (arguing district court abused its discretion in denying
new trial because jury award of $1,450,000 in damages is excessive).
133. Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1435 (citing Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1986)) (allowing for "substantial
deference," court held that amount of jury-awarded damages must be flagrantly
exorbitant or "monstrous" in order to require new trial).
134. See id. (arguing that damages are excessive because period of delay dam-
ages was too long, Del Monte's expert opinions were contrary to weight of evi-
dence and based upon erroneous assumptions).
135. See id. (finding that record disproves City's arguments and jury had am-
ple evidence to reach its conclusions).
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tions, but the hurdle on appeal, especially for a jury trial, appears
too high to overcome for almost any appellant if there was any cred-
ible evidence to support the award. In essence, the City lost all of
its appeal points, but certiorari was granted, and it seemed possible
that the Supreme Court would see eye-to-eye with the City and its
amici.
3. Lessons Learned
Before discussing the Supreme Court's opinion in City of Monte-
rey, it is interesting to note that upon review, this case appears to be
a blatant example of a city desiring to keep land undeveloped with-
out having to condemn the land and pay just compensation. By
tracing this case through the lower courts to the Supreme Court,
some vital aspects of a takings claim become apparent. First, the
claim is difficult to bring to court because of ripeness concerns;
appeals through the administrative agencies can be long and pain-
ful, and a court will only hear a case prior to the exhaustion of
remedies if the landowner can show the futility of further adminis-
trative appeal. Second, the ripeness issue can be extended to the
elements of the taking itself, both the action creating the problem
and the need for a denial of compensation. Third, an equal protec-
tion challenge to a taking, unless shown to involve either a funda-
mental right or a suspect classification, can be defeated by the
defendant simply showing that its actions were rationally related to
a legitimate state interest (a very low standard of scrutiny). Fourth,
the due process claim in a takings action can be defeated unless the
landowner can show that the government action was arbitrary and
irrational, leaving a heavy burden on the plaintiff. Fifth, the section
1983 action may be an ace-in-the-hole for the plaintiff. This may
permit ajury determination for issues of liability and damages, and
ajury appears to have the potential for being more sympathetic to a
burdened landowner than a judge well-versed in common state
practices and constitutional law.
Overall, Del Monte I and II show that there is a remedy for a
private landowner who feels that the government has taken her
property without just compensation, but it is difficult to first enter
court and plead the case, then it is difficult to overcome the bal-
ances weighed heavily in the defendant government's favor. As
Michael M. Berger, the attorney for the plaintiffs, has written,
"[p] eople who spend their lives working in this field and struggling
to wrest coherence from the substantive and procedural goulash
2000]
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prepared by our judicial system sometimes lose sight of the fact that
the ultimate issue is protection of the individual." 136
However, Del Monte I and II show that the property owner may
win. The battle is long and furious, but there are cases where the
landowner wins, and hopefully government actors will take note of
this victory.
4. City of Monterey
Finally, although the case had languished in various lower
courts for almost ten years, the Supreme Court would make a final
decision. The decision was by no means unanimous. 137 The end
result, however, was clear, "the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed."1 3 8 The Court held that this particular section 1983 suit
was an action at law and that the jury issues were properly submit-
ted to the jury, addressing three issues but focusing on the section
1983 jury aspect in great detail. 39
136. Michael M. Berger, Property Owners Have Rights; Lower Courts Need to Protect
Them, in AFTER LucAs: LAND USE REGULATION AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITH-
OUT COMPENSATION 47 (David L. Callies ed. ABA Press 1993) (stating that rights of
property owners are entitled to protection and suggesting that in future courts
should provide more protection to individual rights).
137. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 691. The Syllabus description of majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions reads like an algebraic equation:
KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, the opinion
of the Court with respect to Parts III, IV-A-l, IV-B, V-C, and V, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, and THOMAS, JJ., joined,
and an opinion with respect to Part IV-A-2, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,
and STEVENS and THOMAS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. SOUTER, J., filed
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which
O'CONNOR, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined.
Id.
138. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 723 (overcoming considerable division
among members of Court to uphold judgment of Ninth Circuit).
139. See id. at 702. The three questions presented for the Court were:
(1) whether issues of liability were properly submitted to the jury on Del
Monte Dunes' regulatory takings claim,
(2) whether the Court of Appeals impermissibly based its decision on a
standard that allowed the jury to reweigh the reasonableness of the city's
land-use decision, and
(3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in assuming that the rough-pro-
portionality standard of Dolan v, City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S. Ct.
2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994), applied to this case.
[Vol. XI: p. 349
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First, the Court addressed the three issues in reverse order.140
Section II makes short work of Dolan v. City of Tigard. The Court
stated that "we have not extended the rough-proportionality test of
Dolan beyond the special context of exactions.' 41 Limiting Dolan
to the special category of exactions does not change the face of
takings to any great degree, especially in light of the Court's state-
ment in the sentence before that "in a general sense concerns for
proportionality animate the Takings Clause."' 4 2 However, the Do-
lan test was "inapposite to a case such as this one" since the Court of
Appeals gave an unnecessary discussion of rough proportionality af-
ter holding that "the City has incorrectly argued that no rational
juror could conclude that the City's denial of Del Monte's applica-
tion lacked a sufficient nexus with its stated objectives."' 43 In other
words, rough proportionality from Dolan had no bearing on the
case at hand, and the Court found it an unnecessary part of the
final decision. 144
b. Land-Use Policies and Judicial Scrutiny
Next, Section III addressed the City's challenge to judicial scru-
tiny of the City's land-use decisions.1 45 Before giving a legal discus-
sion of the issue, one can read the issue and see that when a city
claims its land-use decisions are above judicial scrutiny, especially
when making this statement before a judge or body of judges, the
city is going to have problems in defending its claim. When the
Court begins describing the issue as "somewhat obscure," it effec-
140. See id. (beginning with question of appropriateness of application of
rough proportionality standard, then considering whether reasonableness of City's
action was matter for jury to decide, ending with whether liability issue was proper
question for jury to decide).
141. Id. (limiting holding of Dolan to "land-use decisions conditioning ap-
proval of development on the dedication of property to public use").
142. See id. (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)) ("The
Fifth Amendment's guarantee... was designed to bar the Government from forc-
ing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.").
143. Del Monte II, 95 F.3d at 1432 (finding that sufficient evidence supported
Del Monte's claims and rational juror could have decided against City).
144. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 703 (determining that Ninth Circuit's
discussion of rough proportionality "was unnecessary to its decision to sustain...
jury's verdict," and is irrelevant to Court's disposition of case because jury instruc-
tions did not mention proportionality).
145. See id. (arguing that whether City's actions were reasonably related to
legitimate public interest is not question for jury to decide).
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tively sets the tone for further discussion. 14 6 The Court refused to
revisit takings precedents, as urged by amici to the Court.147 The
discussion covered what instructions the City actually proposed and
what the jury actually decided upon, with the Court summarizing by
stating, "[i]n short, the question submitted to the jury on this issue
was confined to whether, in light of all the history and the context
of the case, the City's particular decision to deny Del Monte Dune's
final development proposal was reasonably related to the City's
proffered justifications. ' 148 Thejury issue itself was set aside to Sec-
tion IV of the opinion and the Court concluded that "[t]o the ex-
tent the city argues that, as a matter of law, its land-use decisions are
immune from judicial scrutiny under all circumstances, its position
is contrary to settled regulatory takings principles. We reject this
claim of error."149 The second issue had been resolved, leaving the
Court with the major issue of juries and section 1983 actions in reg-
ulatory takings claims.1 50
c. Submission to the Jury
Section IV constitutes the bulk of the opinion, the material
most commentators will cover, and is also the section which makes
takings only a side issue in City of Monterey. Simply stated, the issue
was "whether it was proper for the District Court to submit the ques-
tion of liability on Del Monte Dunes' regulatory takings claim to the
jury."151 The discussion that follows (in the opinion) will delight
and horrify constitutional scholars, who will focus on the tort/con-
demnation arguments and the questions of law and fact areas. This
article, however, only addresses the regulatory takings issues raised
146. See id. (characterizing City's argument that "Court of Appeals adopted a
legal standard for regulatory takings liability that allows juries to second-guess pub-
lic land-use policy").
147. See id. (declining to reconsider takings precedents because "city did not
challenge below the applicability or continued viability of the general test for regu-
latory takings liability").
148. Id. at 706-07 (examining jury instruction proposed by City and finding it
"clear that the Court of Appeals did not adopt a rule of takings law allowing whole-
sale interference by judge or jury with municipal land-use policies, laws, or routine
regulatory decisions").
149. Id. Note the Court's use of "under all circumstances;" the Court did not
think highly of the City's argument. See id.
150. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 706 (resolving question of appropriate-
ness of application of rough proportionality standard and whether reasonableness
of City's action was matter for jury to decide, Court next addressed last issue,
whether liability issue is proper question to submit to jury).
151. Id. (recognizing that "answer depends on whether Del Monte Dunes had
a statutory or constitutional right to ajury trial, and, if it did, the nature and extent
of the right").
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by the Court. The major topics of City of Monterey are tangential to
the takings standards the author discusses here. With this dis-
claimer in mind, the jury issue must be analyzed.
First, there was a healthy analysis on whether section 1983 con-
fers a jury right on takings claimants, focusing on whether this was
an "action at law" and whether there was "legal relief' being
sought. 152 In essence, the Court held that "a § 1983 suit seeking
legal relief is an action at law within the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment."1 53 Del Monte's action sought relief "[e]ven when
viewed as a simple suit for just compensation."1 54 This was legal
relief because "U]ust compensation... differs from equitable resti-
tution and other monetary remedies available in equity, for in de-
termining just compensation, 'the question is what has the owner
lost, not what has the taker gained.' "155 Putting these pieces to-
gether, " [b] ecause Del Monte Dunes' statutory suit sounded in tort
and sought legal relief, it was an action at law."1 5 6 By giving an
analysis that showed Del Monte Dunes' claim to be sounded in tort,
seeking legal relief, and an action at law, the Court had laid the
groundwork for a jury case. 157 Justice Scalia disagrees with this
analysis since he would allow jury trials for all section 1983 claim-
ants instead of only allowing jury trials for those seeking actions for
152. See id. at 706-717 (going through statutory, constitutional, and historical
analysis and finding Del Monte's suit to be action at law seeking "essentially legal
relief").
153. Id. at 709 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1974)) (finding
that Seventh Amendment jury guarantee extends to "statutory claims unknown to
the common law, so long as the claims can be said to 'soun[d] basically in tort,'
and seek legal relief").
154. Id. at 710 (citing Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S.
340, 352 (1998)) (recognizing "'general rule' that monetary relief is legal" and,
therefore, suit for just compensation seeks legal relief).
155. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 710 (citing Boston Chamber of Commerce v.
Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)) (determining "just compensation is, like ordi-
nary money damages, a compensatory remedy").
156. Id. at 710 (reaffirming holding of Curtis, that jury guarantee of Seventh
Amendment extend to statutory claims sounding in tort and seeking legal
remedy).
157. See id. at 708-09 (summarizing historical analysis set forth in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996)). The Supreme Court has
explained that "[w]e ask, first, whether we are dealing with a cause of action that
either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least analogous to one
that was." Markman, 517 U.S. at 376. Under this analysis, "[i]f the action in ques-
tion belongs in the law category, we then ask whether the particular trial decision
must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as
it existed in 1791." Id. Thus, once a party shows its claim to be sounded in tort
and seeking legal relief, it is an action at law and may properly be submitted to the
jury for deliberation. See id.
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torts. 158 However, his persuasive arguments for jury trials in all sec-
tion 1983 actions did not carry the majority here.
Next, the Court distinguished takings from condemnation
cases. 159 It was important to distinguish the two categories of claims
because "there is no constitutional right to a jury in eminent do-
main proceedings."' 60 The City attempted to analogize the takings
claim with formal condemnation proceedings, arguing that there
was no jury right for Del Monte Dunes.' 61 However, the Court
showed that the analogy was inappropriate, for "[w] hen the govern-
ment takes property without initiating condemnation proceedings,
it 'shifts to the landowner the burden to discover the encroachment
and to take affirmative action to recover just compensation."' 62
Justice Souter disagreed with this, but his argument did not carry
the Court.163 In essence, Del Monte Dunes' "cause of action
sounds in tort and is most analogous to the various actions that lay
at common law to recover damages for interference with property
interests."164
Another argument was that normally, the government may
take property for public use, and therefore the taking "cannot be
tortious or unlawful."' 65 The Court soundly rejected this argument,
clarifying that when the government takes property, it has a duty to
provide just compensation, and when it does not "it violates the
Constitution. In those circumstances the government's actions are
158. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 724-25 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (stating his view that, where Seventh Amendment right
to jury trial is at issue, all § 1983 actions should be treated alike).
159. See id. at 711-12 (finding that "a condemnation action differs in impor-
tant respects from a section 1983 action to redress an uncompensated taking").
Unlike claims involving a taking, in condemnation proceedings, liability is not an
issue in determining just compensation. The Court stated that "[a]s a result, even
if condemnation proceedings were an appropriate analogy, condemnation prac-
tice would provide little guidance on the specific question whether Del Monte
Dunes was entitled to a jury determination of liability." Id.
160. See United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 18 (1970) (holding that issue
of land taken for recreational facilities that had been within original scope of pro-
ject was to be determined by court and not jury).
161. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 711 (explaining City's contention that
"the analogy to formal condemnation proceedings is controlling, so that there is
no jury right here").
162. Id. at 712 (citing United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)) (ex-
plaining that analogy is not only "unhelpful but also inapposite").
163. See id. at 732-55 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is unusual to
charge jury with duty to assess constitutional legitimacy of statutory scheme).
164. Id. at 715. The Court explained that this "conclusion is consistent with
the original understanding of the Takings Clause and with historical practice." Id.
165. Id. at 718. The decision explained that because a taking by the govern-
ment is permissible, it cannot be tortious. See id.
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not only unconstitutional but unlawful and tortious as well. ' 166 Ex-
amples were given from Supreme Court cases and English Com-
mon Law cases showing tort actions dealing with real property
throughout legal history. 167 The Court was definite in its logic that
Del Monte Dunes' action lay in tort. 168
Having set the logical framework, the Court now dealt with the
jury.1 69 With no exact analogy to the current suit, the Court looked
"to history to determine whether the particular issues, or analogous
ones, were decided byjudge or by jury in suits at common law at the
time the Seventh Amendment was adopted. Where history does
not provide a clear answer, we look to precedent and functional
considerations. '170 The Court must sift through a great deal of
cases in order to view the jury issue in regulatory takings cases. 171
In the words of the Court, there is no "definitive answer. '172 By
analyzing the plethora of cases before City of Monterey, the Court
worked through its former decisions to determine fact and law
based issues, finally holding that "the issue whether a landowner
has been deprived of all economically viable use of his property is a
predominantly factual question... [t] his question is for the jury." 73
"This question is for the jury" may be a sentence that strikes
fear in the hearts of government entities across the nation. This
may allow impassioned juries, in contrast to cold-hearted, calculat-
ing judges, to decide the simple factual issue of whether a land-
owner has lost all economic value in a piece of property, but this
166. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 717 (citingJacobs v. United States, 290 U.S.
13, 16 (1933)).
167. See id. at 715 (citing Lindsay v. East Bay Street Commissioners, 2 Bay 38,
61 (S.C. 1796)) (asking "[blut suppose they could sue, what would be the nature
of the action? It could not be founded on contract, for there was none. It must
then be on a tort, it must be an action of trespass, in which the jury would give a
reparation in damages. Is not this acknowledging that the act of the legislature [in
authorizing uncompensated takings] is a tortuous act?").
168. See id. at 715-16 (finding support for Court's conclusion and consistency
with historical understanding and practice).
169. See id. (referring to Markman, 517 U.S. at 384) (satisfying first part of
Markman analysis, whether claim is action at law, Court addressed whether submis-
sion to jury was proper).
170. Id. at 718 (citing Markman, 517 U.S. at 384) (looking to history to deter-
mine when issue is to be given to jury).
171. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 720 (stating that most of Court's decisions
regarding regulatory takings have reviewed suits against United States).
172. See id. at 719 (explaining that while history and precedent are suggestive,
answer remains undetermined).
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should cause no fear. 174 Our legal system is organized so thatjuries
may decide issues; it is fundamental to the United States legal sys-
tem. This pronouncement from the Supreme Court should make
no change in takings trials. Juries are competent to decide this is-
sue of fact.
Finally, the Court frankly admitted a more difficult question
regarding "[t] he jury's role in determining whether a land-use deci-
sion substantially advances legitimate public interests within the
meaning of our regulatory takings doctrine." 175 The only clear gui-
dance from the Court was encapsulated in its statement that the
jury's role is "probably best understood as a mixed question of fact
and law."176 Nothing else. The Court permitted ajury determina-
tion here, only because of the incredibly limiting circumstances of
the protracted history, context, narrowness, and the very factbound
situation in City of Monterey.177
The final subsection of the case, IV C, represented the Court
limiting this decision in as many ways as possible. 178 "[N]ote the
limitations of our Seventh Amendment holding."179 The Court did
not address "ordinary" inverse condemnation suits, takings claims
under § 1983 before complete denial of adequate postdeprivation
remedies, did not give new elements of a temporary regulatory tak-
ings claim, and did not give a "precise demarcation of the respec-
tive provinces ofjudge and jury."180 More limitations were given in
the following sentences of the opinion, but in the end, the reader is
left with the distinct impression that no new ground has been cov-
ered, and no new or different rights have been created, with the
174. This statement is made with tongue-in-cheek. Judges may have passion
and juries may be calculating, but those are the topics for other articles by other
authors.
175. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 1721 (finding issue of jury's role difficult
question).
176. See id. (explaining that this formulation "substantially advances legiti-
mate public interests within ...meaning of... regulatory takings doctrine").
177. See id. (concluding that under described situation, it was proper to sub-
mit questions to jury).
178. See id. (stating that federal court "cannot entertain . .. takings claim
under section 1983 unless or until.. . complaining landowner has been denied an
adequate postdeprivation remedy" and that "posture of the case does not present
an appropriate occasion to define with precision the elements of a temporary regu-
latory takings claim").
179. Id. at 721 (explaining limited role of federal court according to section
1983).
180. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 722 (describing limitations of applicability
of holdings).
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possible exception of allowing juries to determine completely factu-
ally based "loss of all economic value" issues. 81
The Court of Appeals decision was affirmed, and nothing re-
ally changes. 182
D. The Effect of City of Monterey
Before looking at the cases which have cited City of Monterey, it
is interesting to view the media reaction to the opinion. Some au-
thors and commentators have determined that City of Monterey will
have a definite impact on future regulatory takings litigation. John
Armentano, a lawyer dealing in zoning, land use, and environmen-
tal matters, has stated that one thing is clear:
Ij]ury trials are coming to regulatory takings cases brought
under section 1983. The practical ramifications will be sig-
nificant, and will affect the way these cases are prepared
and tried .... In essence, then, the very nature of the way
these cases are tried and prepared likely will change.
Those interested in regulatory takings issues should
closely monitor how these cases are litigated in the
future. 183
Professor Martin A. Schwartz feels that City of Monterey "strongly
supports the right to trial by jury in any federal court § 1983 action
seeking monetary relief." 84 Attorneys Lewis Goldshore and Mar-
sha Wolf list some reactions to the decision, giving comments from
attorneys such as, "providing ajury trial in the takings, Civil Rights
Act, context will be of substantial assistance to landowners," and
"the question of whether or not there has been a taking would be a
181. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 722. The Court severely limits its holding
in City of Monterey. See id. This restriction confines the reach of the Court's deci-
sion and would not cover a "broad challenge to the constitutionality of the city's
general land-use ordinances or policies." Id. The Court stated that "[i]n such a
context, the determination whether the statutory purposes were legitimate, or
whether the purposes, though legitimate, were furthered by the law or general
policy, might well fall within the province of the judge." Id. The Court, therefore,
provided little guidance for future claims arising out of similar but not identical
circumstances.
182. See id. at 722. This may be a gross exaggeration, but the following section
regarding the effect of City of Monterey seems to support the hypothesis that noth-
ing has changed.
183. John Armentano, Regulatory Takings; Jury Trials Will Create Significant Im-
pact on Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 24, 1999, at 5 (concluding that Court's decision in
City of Monterey leaves many questions unresolved and only time and litigation will
provide definitive answers).
184. Martin A. Schwartz, Jury Trial in Section 1983 Actions, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 17,
1999, at 3 (stating that Court's decision affirms position of lower federal courts).
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question for the court, and not the jury, under New Jersey Law,"
and "[1]itigants should think twice before commencing a Civil
Rights Act suit just to obtain a jury trial on the taking issues. ' 185
Looking at only the three citations listed above, it appears that the
reaction is mixed.
As of the writing of this article, 17 cases have cited to City of
Monterey.186 None of these cases applied City of Monterey to provide a
right to jury trial, and the two that dealt with juries did not permit
juries to resolve any issues.18 7 The evidence is small to date, but it
appears that City of Monterey had no substantial effect.
Looking at the media reaction, the effect is mixed. Looking at
the caselaw, there appears to be no change in general takings issues
as a result of City of Monterey. It will take years to judge the true
effect, but as for now, takings jurisprudence seems to be the same
complex, multi-faceted constitutional arena, just as it was before
Del Monte Dunes began its suit.
185. See Lewis Goldshore and Marsha Wolf, Revisiting the Taking Issue Supreme
Court Throws a Bone to Aggrieved Landowners in Del Monte Dunes, N.J.L.J.,July 5,1999,
at 4 (finding that Court's decision enables landowners to present claims to jury but
that it remains to be seen how it will be applied and what portion of claimants will
realize benefit from ruling).
186. See infra note 187.
187. See generally South Port Marine LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. Partnership, 56 F.
Supp.2d 104, 105 (D. Me. 1999) (referring to City of Monterey for non-takings is-
sue); Buckles v. King County, 191 F.3d 1127 (9"' Cir. 1999) (distinguishing this
takings case from City of Monterey); Cutler v. Sedminik, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
21540 (9th Cir. Mont. Sept 3, 1999) (non-takings issue); Chapin v. Hutton, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10560 (D. Idaho June 22, 1999) (referring to City of Monterey for
non-takings issue); Fischer Imaging Corp. v. General Electric, 187 F.3d 1165 (10th
Cir. 1999) (referring to City of Monterey for non-takings issue); Montclair Parkown-
ers Ass'n v. City of Montclair, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999);
Cumberland Farms v. Town of Groton, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3008 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 1999) (finding City of Monterey does not apply, jury demand is
stricken); Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Ferguson, 979 P.2d 1107, (Haw. 1999)
(holding no jury for eminent domain proceedings); Cherry v. Bums, 602 N.W.2d
477 (Neb. 1999) (referring to City of Monterey for non-takings issue); Bonnie Briar
Syndicate v. Town of Mamaroneck, 1999 N.Y. LEXIS 3739 (N.Y. Nov. 23, 1999)
(following holding in City of Monterey); Wertz v. Chapman Twp., 1999 Pa. LEXIS
3750 (Pa. Dec. 21, 1999) (referring to City of Monterey for non-takings issue);
Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 1999 Wash. LEXIS 590 (Wash. Aug.
31, 1999) (remanding in light of City of Monterey); Hansen v. Snohomish County,
1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 1915 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1999) (distinguishing tak-
ings case from City of Monterey); Troy v. Pierce County, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS
1747 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1999) (citing City of Monterey in takings case); Honesty
in Envtl. Analysis & Legislation v. Central Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings
Bd., 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 1669 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1999) (declining to
adopt "dicta" from City of Monterey); Eberle v. Dane County Bd. of Adjustment, 595
N.W.2d 730 (Wis. 1999) (following City of Monterey in takings case).
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II. A SUMMARY OF CURRENT REGULATORY TAKINGS STANDARDS
No major change may have occurred as a result of City of Monte-
rey, but careful review of City of Monterey, and its Del Monte progeni-
tors, shows that there are various takings standards which may or
may not mesh with one another. This section of the article will now
give a short discussion of each takings standard. The difficulty in
writing a short, clean summary of takings jurisprudence is immense;
there are too many valid decisions and possible standards that can
be applied. It is even difficult to define the word. 18 However, for
purposes of this paper, a taking will be defined as a governmental
action that appropriates property for public use without just com-
pensation. In the area of takings, the scholars even disagree on the
types and numbers of categories involved in the takings concept.l8 9
188. The Black's Law Dictionary defines "taking":
There is a "taking" of property when government action directly inter-
feres with or substantially disturbs the owner's use and enjoyment of the
property. To constitute a "taking,[sic] within constitutional limitation, it
is not essential that there be physical seizure or appropriation, and any
actual or material interference with private property fights constitutes a
taking .... Also "taking" of property is affected if application of zoning law
denies property owner of economically viable use of his land, which can
consist of preventing best use of land or extinguishing [a] fundamental
attribute of ownership.
BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 1014 (6th ed. 1991). Also, a legal scholar points out that
"[t]he phrase 'regulatory taking' seems at first blush to be an oxymoron, since a
valid police power regulation is not a 'taking,' and an invalid regulation may be
struck as such." STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 3 (1996).
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, the
Court stated that "[t]he Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the [mere] taking of
property; it proscribes taking without just compensation." 473 U.S. 172, 194
(1985). This analysis demonstrates that a taking may be the concept of uncompen-
sated control of private property, instead of simply the control of the property. See
id.
189. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAw (4th ed. 1997) (listing takings
as facial or as-applied, with Chapter two breaking down at least eight different
variations on as-applied takings, including delay as a taking). Other scholars have
recognized three types of regulatory takings: physical, title, and economic. See
Robert H. Freilich & Elizabeth A. Garvin, Takings after Lucas: Growth Management,
Planning, and Regulatory Implementation Will Wor* Better Than Before, AFTER LucAs:
LAND USE REGULATION AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION, at
54 (David L. Callies ed., ABA Press 1993). Physical taking is self-evident. Title
taking is defined as where the "government acquires incidents of ownership or title
to the property or an exaction in lieu of the dedication of the land." Id. Economic
taking is where "governmental action interferes with the property owner's viable
economic interests in the property." Id. at 55.
Another legal commentary states that "[t]he Supreme Court had developed
two per se takings tests: permanent physical occupation and denial of all economi-
cally viable use." PETER W. SALSICH,JR. & TIMOTHYJ. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULA-
TION 67 (1998). Along with the two per se takings were takings involving violation
of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 89.
2000]
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This section of the article will only focus on regulatory takings, 190
and for purposes of this article, I will adopt the three standards set
forth in Stuart Miller's work: the statutory, the categorical, and the
balancing standards.1 91 These three standards blend too much to
satisfy a purist, but an attempt to draw three distinct lines helps in
understanding the basic takings standards. In discussing these stan-
dards, the facts of the cases will be ignored or given short shrift, and
quotations will be ripped from their cases without much, if any,
contextual discussion.
A. The Statutory Standard
The statutory standard is a simple facial challenge to the stat-
ute or regulation, asking whether the regulation is a legitimate ex-
ercise of the state's police power or the analogous regulatory power
of the federal government.192 According to the Supreme Court in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,193 for takings cases with due
process elements, the due process claims are treated distinctly, and
the standard appears to be "whether the State could rationally have
decided the measure adopted might achieve the State's objec-
tive." 194 For the actual takings claims, the regulation "must substan-
In a law review article that challenges some common takings concepts, Stuart
Miller argues that there are five categories of takings: being eminent domain, oc-
cupation, and the three regulatory takings under the standards of categorical, stat-
utory, and balancing. See generally Stuart Miller, Triple Ways to Take: The Evolution
and Meaning of the Supreme Court's Three Regulatory Taking Standards 71 TEMP. L.
REv. 243 (1998).
There are numerous other interpretations, but these four works give a good
sampling of the various concepts in this field.
190. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 646-47
(1981). "Regulatory takings" itself is a phrase with special meaning; it only first
appeared in published federal and state cases in the late 1970s, and was first used
in a United States Supreme Court opinion in 1981, inJustice Brennan's dissent in
San Diego Gas & Electric Company v. City of San Diego. See id. (Brennan, J.
dissenting).
During 1992, "regulatory takings" was used in at least 36 federal and 45 state
cases, 25 law review articles and 152 other publications, and the docket of annual
filings of U.S. Court of Claims doubled for regulatory takings (over the past dec-
ade). SeeJ. Carlton, "Takings" Cases Don't Always Favor Takers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10,
1992, at BI) (discussing definition of "regulatory takings").
191. See generally Miller, supra note 189 (discussing categories of takings chal-
lenging traditional takings concepts).
192. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (stating that land
use regulation does not amount to taking if it advances legitimate interests and
does not deny an owner economically viable use of his land).
193. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (estab-
lishing essential nexus test).
194. See id. at 834-35 n.3 (emphasis omitted) (noting that "broad range" of
governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these requirements).
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tially advance the legitimate state interest sought to be achieved." 95
This standard gives some deference to state legislatures, but the
standard has been affected adversely for the legislatures. 196
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission'9 7 changes the statu-
tory standard, with the Supreme Court rejecting historic deference
to statements of legislative goals and "emphasize [s] that to win its
case [on remand,] South Carolina must do more than proffer the
legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent
with the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate
a common-law maxim." 98 This language from Lucas seems to favor
the landowner, and it makes it more difficult for a legislature to
show that its statute represents a legitimate state interest.19 9 Dolan
v. City of Tigard also seems to favor the private landowner, stating:
In evaluating most generally applicable zoning regula-
tions, the burden properly rests on the party challenging
the regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary reg-
ulation of property rights. Here, by contrast, the city
made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's
application for a building permit on an individual parcel.
In this situation, the burden properly rests on the city. 200
Nollan sets the standard to attack a statute facially, and Lucas and
Dolan seem to tilt the scales in favor of the private landowner in
challenging that statute.201 The landowner must challenge the stat-
195. Id. at 834 n.3 (citations omitted) (discussing standard of review for ac-
tual takings claim).
196. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-90 (comparing different requirements in vari-
ous states wherein some courts exercise more deference to legislatures than
others).
197. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
198. Id. at 1031 (stating that common law principles "rarely support prohibi-
tion of... essential use of land").
199. See Lucas, SOS U.S. at 1046 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
commented on the Court's sudden antipathy toward state legislatures:
The Court decides the State has the burden to convince the courts that its
legislative judgments are correct. Despite Lucas' complete failure to con-
test the legislature's findings of serious harm to life and property if a
permanent structure is built, the Court decides that the legislative find-
ings are not sufficient to justify the use prohibition. Instead, the Court
"emphasize [s]" the State must do more than merely proffer its legislative
judgments to avoid invalidating its law. In this case, apparently, the State
now has the burden of showing the regulation is not a taking. The Court
offers no justification for its sudden hostility toward state legislators.
Id. (citation omitted).
200. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836) (suggesting
that "rough proportionality" best describes Fifth Amendment requirements).
201. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text (discussing burdens ap-
plied to government entities).
20001
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ute and show that it does not "substantially advance" a "legitimate
state interest," two phrases that require a great deal of work, but
with Lucas and Dolan rejecting statements of state interest, the chal-
lenge may have been made a little easier for a burdened
landowner. 202
City of Monterey may further support the property owner by
holding that the substantial advancement/legitimate state interest
question may be one heard by juries as a mixed question of fact and
law. 20 3 However, City of Monterey is so limited, and so specific, fol-
lowing a specific context and history of actions between the City
and Del Monte Dunes, that the jury determination of substantial
advancement will be limited to a very select few cases.204
B. The Categorical Standard
The categorical standard refers to those cases where the Su-
preme Court has said that there is always a taking.20 5 This standard
is arguably a subset of the balancing test, but as will be shown, this is
different from the balancing test where the essential fairness of the
regulation is at issue.20 6 Lucas refers to "two discrete categories of
regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into
the public interest advanced in support of the restraint."20 7 The
two categories are: (1) regulations that compel the landowner to
suffer a physical invasion on his property,20 8 and (2) "where regula-
tion denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
202. See generally Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.
203. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 720-21 (explaining that inquiry involves
both factual and legal components).
204. See id. (stating that question submitted to jury was whether, when viewed
"in light of the context and protracted history of the development application pro-
cess, the city's decision to reject a particular development plan bore a reasonable
relationship to its proffered justifications .... Under these circumstances, we hold
that is was proper to submit this narrow, factbound question to the jury").
205. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (stating that no matter how small intrusion or
"weighty" public interest, compensation is required).
206. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (discussing when appropriate to balance indi-
vidual's interests by government's interest).
207. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (stating that regulation is compensable without
case specific inquiry in two instances).
208. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982) (finding New York law requires landlords to allow television cable compa-
nies to place cable facilities in apartment buildings); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979) (discussing imposition of navigation servitude on private ma-
rina); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (examining physical invasions
of airspace).
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land."20 9 These categories are quite straightforward, but there is
one exception, known as the "Nuisance Exception:"
All property in this country is held under the implied obli-
gation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to
the community .... [T]he police power extends, at least,
to the protection of the lives, the health, and the property
of the community against the injurious exercise by any citi-
zen of his own rights.210
The Nuisance Exception further states that "[a] prohibition simply
upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid
legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an
appropriation of property for the public benefit."211 In other
words, private property is held under the understanding that the
landowner may not create or continue a public nuisance emanating
from the property.212 Because a landowner holds property under
this understanding, "[c]ourts have consistently held that a State
need not provide compensation when it diminishes or destroys the
value of property by stopping illegal activity or abating a public nui-
sance."21 3 This nuisance exception may seem exceptionally friendly
to the government, but defining the term "public nuisance" has al-
ways been difficult, and there are more parts to the categorical stan-
dard which limit the government's effectiveness.2 14
Another part of the categorical standard deals with the cate-
gory of exactions, matching the condition to the restriction. In Nol-
lan, the language reads that there must be a "nexus between the
condition [the easement] and the original purpose of the building
209. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; see also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260 (1980) (discussing denial of economic benefit of land); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834
(same); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 295-
96 (1981) (same).
210. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665-66 (1887) (holding Kansas law
preventing manufacture of certain products because they were considered nui-
sance violated Constitution).
211. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491
(1987); see also Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69 (stating that law in question crossed line
between regulation and confiscation).
212. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 491 (stating that public as
whole is benefited by restrictions on land use).
213. Id. at 492 n.22 (stating that because it is assumed that people will not use
their property in way that harms community, Takings Clause does not require
compensation when states enforce such principles).
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restriction [the permit requirement]. "215 In Dolan, there must be a
reasonable relationship between the dedication/exaction and the
projected impact, best termed as a "rough proportionality [which]
best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth
Amendment."2 1 6 Both the nexus and the rough proportionality
show that if the relationship between the requirement and the
property's impact is not adequately proportionate, a taking has oc-
curred. 217 The Supreme Court took care, however, to again point
out that Dolan applies only in the case of exactions.218 In City of
Monterey, the Court states, "we have not extended the rough-propor-
tionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions- land-
use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedica-
tion of property to public use."219 However, the category of exac-
tions is, in itself, a healthy area for takings jurisprudence.
The categorical standard for takings also recognizes the con-
cept of temporary takings.220 The Supreme Court explained that
"where the government's activities have already worked a taking of
all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of its duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective." 221 The concept of temporary tak-
ings gives more ammunition to the landowner in a takings action
against the government. 222 Along with the "nexus between the con-
dition and the permit," the "rough proportionality" of the same,
the physical invasion, and the denial of "all economically beneficial
215. Id. In Nollan, the Supreme Court specifically required an essential nexus
between the government condition attached to a permit and the purpose of the
regulation. See id.
216. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
217. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver County, 911 P.2d 429, 440 (Cal. 1996) (find-
ing "cash exaction" case, where discretionary monetary fees imposed on individual-
ized basis must meet Dolan "rough proportionality" test).
218. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 703 (stating that Dolan test, rough-propor-
tionality, is limited in application to exactions).
219. Id. The Supreme Court noted the absence of a definitive statement re-
garding the proper standard of review for a case involving a temporary regulatory
taking. See id.
220. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (stating that no matter how small intrusion, com-
pensation may be required, "at least with regard to permanent intrusions," leaving
door open for compensation in temporary restrictions).
221. Id. The Court held that once a regulatory taking has occurred, the gov-
ernment must provide compensation - which in turn benefits the land owner as it
requires compensation without regard to the public interest - in the case of a physi-
cal taking. See id.
222. See id. (stating that once regulatory taking has occurred, government
must provide compensation).
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or productive use," there are sufficient arguments for the land-
owner to possibly prevail in a categorical takings claim.
223
In City of Monterey, the Court bluntly stated that "this Court has
provided neither a definitive statement of the elements of a claim
for a temporary regulatory taking nor a thorough explanation of
the nature or applicability of the requirement that a regulation sub-
stantially advance legitimate public interests outside the context of
required dedications or exactions." 224 The Court goes on to refuse
revisiting any takings standards but simply states that in City of Mon-
terey, "the trial court's instructions are consistent with our previous
general discussions of regulatory takings liability."22 5 In other
words, the Court has neither changed nor clarified the standards in
the newest case City of Monterey.
City of Monterey also seems to allow ajury to determine the sim-
ple factual issue of whether all economic value has been lost.
22 6
This is no great milestone for private property advocates, though,
because this simple factual question should be clear to both judges
and juries. No greater protection is offered by City of Monterey. 227
However, when categorical takings fail in court, there is one more
standard which the landowner may apply.
C. The Balancing Standard
The balancing standard is an ad hoc attempt to evaluate all the
factors of a case to determine essential fairness.228 Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon gives the basic formulation for this test:
"[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as
a taking."229 With this kind of loose standard, a court may actually
weigh the equities to determine whether a taking has, in fact, oc-
curred. The factors to be weighed are numerous, and are well-
223. See id. at 1015-16 (summarizing categorical standards).
224. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 704. In City of Monterey, the Court declared
that the past standards of review were inapplicable to the current facts. See id.
225. Id. Furthermore, the Court refused to delineate a standard of review.
See id.
226. See id. at 721 (leaving determination of economic loss up to jury).
227. For a discussion of City of Monterey, see supra notes 137-82 and accompa-
nying text.
228. See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
229. Id. at 415. Pennsylvania Coal involved a dispute over the mining of prop-
erty that may cause subsidence of surface and house due to the removal of support
by mining activity. See id.
2000]
39
Payne: The Current State of Regulatory Takings in Supreme Court Jurispru
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
388 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. XI: p. 349
sprinkled throughout various court decisions. 230 Two major factors
from the Supreme Court are: (1) the reciprocity of advantage from
Pennsylvania Coal,231 and (2) the extent to which regulation inter-
feres with a property owner's "distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions"23 2 or the "reasonable, investment-backed expectation. '" 233
The effect of Lucas has been to give more balancing factors, listed
under a "total taking" inquiry:
The "total taking" inquiry we require today will ordinarily
entail (as the application of state nuisance law ordinarily
entails) analysis of, among other things, the degree of
harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private
property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities, see,
e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 826, 827, the social
value of the claimant's activities and their suitability to the
locality in question, see, e.g., id., §§ 828(a) and (b), 831,
and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be
avoided through measures taken by the claimant and the
government (or adjacent private landowners) alike, see,
e.g., id., §§ 827 (e), 828(c), 830.234
Although these factors are listed under the "total taking" inquiry of
the categorical standard, they are now listed in a Supreme Court
opinion that could arguably be used to show the inequities of a
taking under the balancing standard. The balancing standard is
230. Some scholars argue that states use case-specific analysis balancing the
following factors:
a. the character of the government action
b. the impact of the regulation on the landowner
c. interference with investment-backed expectations
d. the nuisance exception
e. capitalization of the threat of a regulation in to the sale price of the
land
f. existence of an essential nexus
g. whether the regulation singles-out the landowner.
See COMPENSATION FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS WITH APPLICA-
TIONS 47 (The Economics of Legal Relationships Series, Vol. 1, Nicholas Mercuro
ed., 1996).
231. See Pennsylvania Coal 260 U.S. at 415 (looking at advantage or benefit
conferred on regulated parties by regulation).
232. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
The Court explained that the owners had not established a taking merely by show-
ing that they had been denied the right to exploit super adjacent airspace. See id.
233. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984). Ruckelshaus
stands for the proposition that to the extent the registrant of pesticides had an
interest in health, safety and environmental data as a trade secret under Missouri
law, it is a property right protected by the Fifth Amendment. See id.
234. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31.
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the most broad of the three standards, and it permits the land-
owner to argue that the government action simply is not fair. The
argument will be backed by substantial evidence, but it boils down
to simply calling "foul" and pleading for equity before a court.
D. The Effectiveness of the Three Takings Standards
Looking at the three standards, it appears that the statutory
standard is the most difficult to argue, because the landowner must
overcome a showing of legitimate state interest, and notwithstand-
ing potentially helpful language in Lucas and Dolan, this is the most
difficult fight. The categorical standard is the simplest to argue, if
its effect is clear. If the property truly has no value, or if there is a
physical occupation, then the case should be deemed a taking. 23 5
However, if there is an exaction question, it looks more like a bal-
ancing dilemma, arguing that the exaction is not proportional to
the landowner's development. 23 6 There is also the denominator
problem, arguing over whether the taking applies as a total taking
to the one affected parcel of land, or if the taking only devalues the
entire property with respect to the singular parcel. Finally, the bal-
ancing standard seems like the standard that would appeal most to
a zealous advocate who truly wants to argue the equities of a takings
case.
However, the balancing argument has not had a very high suc-
cess rate. 23 7 In fact, none of the arguments have had much success
in the state or federal Supreme Courts, according to extensive re-
search by authors ThomasJ. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson.2 38 Out
of five state supreme courts analyzed between the years of 1990-
1995, only five of the fifty-two (5/52) takings cases resulted in the
finding of a government taking. In the United States Supreme
Court, from the period 1979-1994, out of fifteen total cases, five
were deemed to be takings (5/15). This works out to a 9.6% suc-
cess rate for private property plaintiffs in state courts and a 33.3%
success rate in the United States Supreme Court.239
235. See id. at 1015-16 (stating circumstances in which taking occurs and com-
pensation is mandated).
236. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (stating that discretionary monetary fees im-
posed on individualized basis must meet "rough proportionality" test).
237. See THOMASJ. MICELI & KATHLEEN SEGERSON, COMPENSATION FOR REGULA-
TORY TAKINGS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS WITH APPLICATIONS (The Economics of Le-
gal Relationships Series, Vol. 1, Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1996) (evaluating
economics of takings law).
238. See id.
239. There is an excellent table listing which constitutional argument had the
highest success rate for showing a taking. In the state supreme courts, impact on
2000]
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The numbers are even worse for wetlands and floodplain regu-
lation cases at the state and local level, where, as of 1994, there were
over 400 cases at state level with only about thirty resulting in the
finding of a taking.240 From these numbers, it looks like takings
arguments do not do very well at trial. However well this conclu-
sion may be justified, it does ignore the fact that governments may
generally compensate adequately or even more-than-adequately for
most condemnation actions, with only the fringe cases ever reach-
ing litigation, and only the most severe of those reaching the appel-
late and Supreme Court level.241 This is speculation, and it is best
suited to another article, at another time.
III. CONCLUSION
There are various standards that a landowner may use when he
feels that his property is "taken" by government action.2 42 The suc-
cess rate may not be high, and the legal battle may be difficult, but
not impossible. It is interesting to note that states seem to be react-
ing to this low success rate by passing more protective legislation for
the private property owner; there has been a rise in state legislation
the landowner accounted for 4 takings out of 31 cases, 4/31, the intent of the
regulation rate was 0/6, landowner expectations 2/8, the "essential nexus" 0/0,
ripeness 0/19, and "other" 1/3. At the United States Supreme Court level, impact
on landowner 3/6, intent of regulation 1/3, landowner expectations 0/2, "essen-
tial nexus" 2/2, ripeness 0/5, and "other" 0/2. See id.
240. See id. at 189 (discussing futility of challenging a wetland or floodplain
regulation).
241. On an interesting note, the fringe cases also make excellent topics for
pursuing, in the words of Paul Harvey, "the rest of the story." The best example is
in Lucas, where, after the case was remanded to the South Carolina courts, the
government settled the case and bought the two lots for $425,000 each (with inter-
est and costs about a $1.5 million settlement). The government, which had previ-
ously wanted to allow Lucas only a 144-square-foot viewing platform and
landscaping, sold the property to a private individual for development so that it
could recoup its purchase price. The attorney for the Coastal Council and South
Carolina, Bachman S. Smith, III, was reported as saying, 'The state also considered
keeping the lots open, but with a house to either side and in between the lots, it is
reasonable and prudent to allow houses to be built." H. Jane Lehman, Accord Ends
Fight Over Use of Land, WASH. PosT, July 17, 1993, at E-1 (Real Estate). In response
to that state's action, John Echeverria, chief counsel for the National Audubon
Society, said this decision "opens the state to charges of hypocrisy when it is willing
to have an economic burden fall on an individual but not when the funds have to
come out of an agency's budget." Id.; see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY
TAKINGS: LAw, ECONOMICS, AND PoLrrlcs 61 (1995) (commenting on state's action
by saying that "when its own money was on the table, the state was unwilling to
forgo $77,500 to preserve one of the lots whose previous value of $600,000 to the
owner it had denied was a compensable loss").
242. For a discussion of takings standards, see supra notes 188-234 and accom-
panying text.
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dealing with private property owner rights, 243 with more proposed
takings legislation in almost every state.2 44 Takings have received
much attention in books, law review articles, and the courts. There
is a movement for requiring government to compensate individuals
for costs which arguably should be borne by the public in general.
The author is not competent to comment on the future of takings,
but it appears that the landowner may stand a chance.
To keep the reality of takings in focus, it is best to close with a
quotation used earlier, "[p] eople who spend their lives working in
this field and struggling to wrest coherence from the substantive
and procedural goulash prepared by our judicial system sometimes
lose sight of the fact that the ultimate issue is protection of the indi-
vidual. ' 245 The ultimate issue should be protection of the individ-
ual. When considering this ultimate issue in the light of City of
Monterey, the author hopes that the Supreme Court will give more
guidance in how to protect the interest of burdened landowners.
243. See Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings
Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187, 191 (1997). According to Mark W. Cordes, 17
states currently have active takings legislation. See id. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
605 (Supp. 1996) (codifying state's takings regulatory scheme); see also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 70.001 (West Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 67-8001 to § 67-8004 (1995); IND.
CODE ANN. § 4-22-2-31-32 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-701-707 (Supp.
1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:2609, § 3:3622.1 (West Supp. 1997); 1996 MICH.
LEGIS. SERV. 101 (West); Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-33-1 - § 49-33-19 (Supp. 1996); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 536.017 (West Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-10-101-105 (1995);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-02.5 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-1-201-206
(Supp. 1996); TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 2007.041-.045 (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-90-1-4 (Supp. 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.370 (West Supp.
1997); W. VA. CODE § 22-1A-1-3 (1994); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-5-301-305 (Michie
1995).
244. See Cordes, supra note 243, at n.17 (explaining "[iun... first two years of
the takings legislation movement, 1992 and 1993, thirty-nine states considered tak-
ings legislation, with thirty-two states considering legislation in 1993 alone."); see
also STATE TAKINGS LEGISLATION: A RESOURCE BOOK FOR ACTIVIsTs 5-7 (National
Audubon Society, 1993) (discussing proposed takings regulations).
245. Berger, supra note 53, at 27. This scholar explained that the ultimate
issue in land use regulations is the protection of the individual. See id.
2000]
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